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Westudy the extent of political homophily—the tendency to formconnectionswith otherswhoare politically similar—in local
governments’ decisions to participate in an important form of intergovernmental collaboration: regional planning networks.
Using data from a recent survey of California planners and government officials, we develop and test hypotheses about
the factors that lead local governments to collaborate within regional planning networks. We find that local governments
whose constituents are similar politically, in terms of partisanship and voting behavior, are more likely to collaborate with
one another in regional planning efforts than those whose constituents are politically diverse. We conclude that political
homophily reduces the transaction costs associated with institutional collective action, even in settings where we expect
political considerations to be minimal.
Interest in political networks has grown substantiallyin recent years. An emerging political science lit-erature seeks to understand the structure, proper-
ties, and consequences of networks comprised of po-
litical actors such as legislators (Caldeira and Patterson
1987; Fowler 2006), legislative staffers (Victor and Ringe
2009), political activists (Heaney and Rojas 2009), con-
ventiondelegates (Heaney et al. 2010), and interest groups
(Grossman and Dominguez 2009). Building on a large
body of theoretical and empirical work on social net-
works, one of the leading hypotheses is that actors with
similar characteristics will be more likely to form net-
work ties than actors with different characteristics. This
phenomenon, known as homophily, is consistently iden-
tified as an important determinant of network struc-
ture (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). In this
article, we assess the importance of a specific form
of homophily that is of particular interest to political
scientists—the extent to which actors with similar polit-
ical characteristics are more likely to collaborate—in the
area of land-use planning.
Land-use planning is arguably one of the most im-
portant functions of local governments as it fundamen-
Elisabeth R. Gerber is Jack L.Walker, Jr. Professor of Public Policy and Political Science, University ofMichigan, 5228Weill Hall, 735 S. State
St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (ergerber@umich.edu). AdamDouglas Henry is Assistant Professor of Government and Public Policy, University
of Arizona, 315 Social Science Building, P.O. Box 210027, Tucson, AZ 85721 (adhenry@email.arizona.edu). Mark Lubell is Professor of
Environmental Science and Policy, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616 (mnlubell@ucdavis.edu).
1Local governments derive these powers from state constitutions and legislation. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld these powers in
numerous cases, notably Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co, 1926.
tally shapes a community’s physical development, so-
cial structure, tax base, and quality of life (Levy 2009).
Land-use planning involves the creation of land-use plans
and zoning ordinances that specify the kinds of devel-
opment and redevelopment allowed in specific areas, as
well as plans for transportation systems, public facilities,
physical infrastructure, open space, and environmental
amenities. Land-use planning is mainly conducted by in-
dividual local governments (i.e., cities, villages, towns,
counties, etc.), resulting in policies that are responsive to
actors within a given jurisdiction but that often create
externalities and inefficiencies for others in the region
(Kwon and Feiock 2008).1 A classic example of this
dilemma is when City A’s decision to allow high-density
development creates congestion and lowers property val-
ues in a neighboring City B, yet City B has little or no
power to influence the land-use decisions within City A’s
boundaries.
Regional land-use planning is advocated as a way of
mitigating some of the negative consequences of local
land-use planning. Regional planning involves the cre-
ation of intergovernmental networks; participation in
these networks encourages local governments to work
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together to share information and develop land-use poli-
cies that address regional goals. Advocates contend that
by providing an explicitmechanism for reducing negative
externalities (and perhaps increasing positive externali-
ties), regional planning producesmore efficient, effective,
and equitable decisions about how to share the costs and
benefits of development across the region (Benjamin and
Nathan 2001; Friedmann andWeaver 1980; Norris 2001).
We study regional land-use planning efforts as a lens
through which to understand the role of homophily in
political networks. The core theoretical contribution of
our research is to integrate social network theory and the
concept of political homophily into the “institutional col-
lective action” approach to local government collabora-
tion (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001; Feiock 2007, 2009).2
ICA argues that collaboration emerges from a political
contracting process where local policy actors weigh the
potential benefits and transaction costs of various forms
of interaction. The benefits and transaction costs of col-
laboration are thought to derive primarily from the policy
problems being addressed (e.g., affordable housing, open
space management, transit systems), the economic ben-
efits to the potential participants, and the internal char-
acteristics of the individual local governments (Feiock
2007).
However, while the ICA perspective acknowledges
that local government officials pay attention to the elec-
toral consequences of collaboration, it does not directly
address the partisan or ideological aspects of decision
making. Intergovernmental collaboration requires polit-
ical actors to make policy decisions in an often highly
contentious political environment. It is therefore impor-
tant to consider whether and how broader political and
ideological considerations shape local governments’ deci-
sions about participation in regional planning networks,
over and above the factors traditionally considered in the
transaction-cost approach.
Specifically, we argue that similarities on politically
relevant characteristics between twoormore local govern-
ments (i.e., political homophily) reduce the transaction
costs of engaging in collective action and hence increase
2Throughout this article, we use the term “collaboration” to re-
fer to any explicit and mutually recognized joint policymaking
interaction between local government actors. The literature on in-
tergovernmental collaboration identifies interactions with varying
degrees of formality, including sharing information and person-
nel, joint research and funding proposals, interagency task forces,
shared permitting, and other diverse activities (Bardach 1998). The
survey data that form the basis of our empirical analysis use the
terms “collaborate” and “collaboration” and do not distinguish be-
tween these more informal and formal interactions. Conceptually,
we expect that many different forms of collaboration take place
within regional planning networks. Future research will further
investigate the nature of these different forms of interaction.
the probability of collaborating in regional planning net-
works. This political logic of collaboration represents an
important extension of the ICA approach to intergov-
ernmental collaboration, and our analysis provides com-
pelling empirical evidence for the claim that politically
similar governments tend to work together.
However, our argument goes beyond simply inserting
political considerations into the ICA framework. We ar-
gue that the political processes analyzed in this article are
pervasive even in the face of institutional arrangements
designed to minimize partisan and ideological concerns.
For example, many cities, including those in California
that form the basis of our empirical analyses, are “reform”
cities with nonpartisan elections and manager-council
forms of government. Furthermore, our study takes place
in the context of regional planning institutions designed
to create collaboration across political boundaries and
partisan and ideological cleavages. Bothmanager-council
forms of government and regional planning institutions
are believed to reduce the influence of ideology and parti-
sanship in thepolicy process and focus on finding efficient
policy solutions. Yet our results demonstrate that the po-
litical logic of local collaboration remains, even in the
presence of these institutions.
We test our political homophily hypothesis using data
from a unique survey of local government officials in five
California regions. We first use Geographic Information
System (GIS) methods to visualize and characterize the
regional planning networks in each region in a spatially
explicit manner. We then construct measures of political
distance (i.e., how similar or different pairs of jurisdic-
tions are on various political characteristics), aswell as the
similarity of demographic and population characteristics
and the geographic proximity between local jurisdictions
in each region, and link these patterns to each area’s re-
gional planning network. Our hypotheses are tested using
exponential random graphmodels of network structure.
Political Homophily and Regional
Planning
Regional land-use planning is a form of collective action;
it involves autonomous local governments voluntarily in-
curring some costs for the benefit of the region.3 As such,
we expect the logic of institutional collective action (ICA)
to influence the structure of regional planning networks
3As with any collective action problem, there may also be private
benefits to the individual actors. Still, the presence of individual
costs and collective benefits creates conditions for the classic col-
lective action dilemma (Olson 1965).
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(Feiock 2007, 2009). ICA argues that collaboration will
emerge when the benefits of collective action outweigh
the transaction costs of searching for mutually beneficial
solutions, bargaining over different policies, and mon-
itoring and enforcing any resulting agreements (Feiock
2009; Maser 1998). But the existing literature has placed
little emphasis on how the inherently political calculus of
regional planning is linked to the benefits and transaction
costs of collaboration. Participants in regional planning
efforts are political actors—mayors, city council mem-
bers, county supervisors, planning commissionmembers,
and administrative staff—who agree to share information
and resources, and who make joint land-use decisions
with neighboring jurisdictions and the organizations that
comprise a regional planning network. These local polit-
ical actors may then be held accountable by their local
constituents for land-use decisions over which the collec-
tive, and not just they, themselves, have ultimate control.
Political science researchhasdemonstrated that variations
in political costs and benefits within individual jurisdic-
tions help explain the extent to which political actors are
willing to engage in regional policy andplanning activities
(Feiock and Kim 2000; Gerber and Gibson 2009; Lubell,
Feiock, and de la Cruz 2009; Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez
2005). However, little research to date seeks to describe
or understand how political relationships between actors
affect these costs and benefits.
Our political homophily hypothesis provides a link
between these notions of transaction costs from ICA
and insights from social network theory about relation-
ships between political actors. Specifically, we can think
about various forms of political homophily as affect-
ing the transaction costs of collective action. The costs
of searching for mutually beneficial policy decisions are
lower when local jurisdictions whose citizens are politi-
cally similar also have similar policy preferences and ideas
about the appropriate role of government, in planning as
well as other areas. Peoplewho self-identify asDemocratic
and/or as politically liberal may favor specific planning-
related policies such as affordable housing, higher-density
development, and public transit (National Association of
Realtors 2011, 30), as well as a more expansive role for
government (Gallup 2010). Those who self-identify as
Republicans and/or as politically conservative may favor
different policies and in general a more limited govern-
ment role. It is reasonable to expect that, all else constant,
government leaders in cities with politically similar pop-
ulations will prefer to pursue similar policies.4 Two cities
4This assumes that local government officials will seek to pur-
sue policies that are favored by their residents. While Page and
Shapiro (1983) have demonstrated a link between public opinion
that are politically similar may therefore find it easier
to identify and agree upon mutually beneficial policies,
while two cities that are politically distant may find little
common ground.
Political similarity also reduces the bargaining
costs of regional planning, which involves a form of
redistribution—in this case, redistribution of the costs
and benefits from development and other land uses—
between residents of different cities within a region. For
example, regional land-use plans that incentivize devel-
opment in one city and limit it in another may result in
net benefits for some residents in the region and net costs
for others. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Alesina and
Giuliano (2009) show that survey respondents are less
supportive of redistribution when the recipients are dif-
ferent from themselves; we expect the same biases to hold
with respect to regional planning. In addition, even if they
can agree on regional policies in the short term, local gov-
ernment officials may be reluctant to commit to a long-
term regional planning effort with cities whose residents’
political orientations are very different, and hence whose
preferences are likely to diverge over future policies. To
the extent that local residents oppose collaboration with
politically distant communities, local officials who partic-
ipate nonetheless risk the loss of electoral support, or even
the threat of a recall effort.5 Anticipating these potential
political costs, local decision makers may prefer to act in-
dependently, rather than risk being punished electorally
by their constituents for cooperation.
In sum, political similarity affects the political calcu-
lus of collaboration, in particular by decreasing the search
costs of discovering and bargaining over the distribution
of costs and benefits from joint activities. The political
and policy at the national level, the question is less settled at the
local level, in part because “reform” council-manager governments
are expected to moderate partisan politics. However, even non-
partisan elected officials must abide by electoral imperatives and
thus respond to citizen preferences. Appointed city officials with
a planning background or other professional training also adopt
professional norms regarding providing the best service to their
citizens (Teodoro 2011). The tendency for local governments to
provide different bundles of public goods and taxes in anticipation
of residents voting with their feet is a core hypothesis in urban
politics (Peterson 1981; Tiebout 1956).
5The perception of this electoral threatmay be greater than the real-
ity, as it is difficult to identify definitive instanceswhere constituents
successfully mobilized against an elected official in response to a
city’s decision to participate in a regional planning effort. Never-
theless, politicians may act on the basis of perceptions and may
be highly risk averse when it comes to avoiding potentially con-
troversial decisions that may incite organized electoral opposition.
Appointed officials may be sensitive to these electoral pressures as
well, as they typically serve at the pleasure of elected officials who
may dismiss the appointees if the appointees’ actions jeopardize
their boss’s electoral security.
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calculus that reinforces these dynamics is not typically
considered in the ICA literature, which focuses mostly on
the economics of regional public good provision. Based
on consideration of these political dynamics, we hypoth-
esize that political similarity will increase (and political
differences will reduce) the probability that two cities col-
laborate in a regional planning network.
Demographics, Population Growth,
and Geographic Homophily
Testing for political homophily in regional planning net-
works requires controlling for other factors that may
influence the benefits and costs of intergovernmental
collaboration. Three classes of attributes traditionally
considered in the planning literature are socioeconomic
characteristics, population size and growth patterns, and
geographic proximity.
Homophily and Socioeconomic
Characteristics
An extensive planning literature identifies the socioeco-
nomic characteristics of a community’s population as
important determinants of that jurisdiction’s land-use
planning preferences (Levy 2009). More affluent popu-
lations tend to prefer certain types of land-use patterns—
limiting growth, maintaining low density requirements,
preserving land for recreation and open space—that are
different from those preferred by poor populations—
increasing densities, supplying affordable housing, etc.
(Fischel 1985, 2001; Lubell, Feiock, and de la Cruz 2009;
but seeNational Association of Realtors 2011, which finds
that people in the highest income group may now prefer
higher densities in the context of smart growth develop-
ment). We expect socioeconomic similarity to represent
an important category of homophily drivers. When two
or more cities have populations with similar socioeco-
nomic profiles, they may perceive the benefits of coop-
eration to be higher since they can combine their efforts
to achieve similar planning goals; when they have very
different populations, they may perceive greater conflict
over their land-use policy preferences.
We also consider racial/ethnic composition as a
second demographic category. Numerous scholars and
observers have documented the distinctive patterns of
political behavior—particularly voting—by California’s
racial and ethnic minority groups (e.g., see Barreto
and Ramirez 2004; Segura and Fraga 2008; Tolbert and
Hero 1996). These studies find that while minorities
are, on average, more liberal and more likely to support
Democratic candidates and policy positions than white
voters, there are important exceptions to this general ten-
dency (Barreto and Ramirez 2004).6 Latino voters in par-
ticular, who have been targeted by recent anti-immigrant
ballot proposals but also aggressively courted by political
candidates of both parties, are seen as a critical, distinc-
tive, and growing political bloc, especially in California.
From the perspective of local government officials, the
size of the minority population in other cities may serve
as an important indicator of the degree of preference sim-
ilarity, above and beyond socioeconomic characteristics.
We therefore hypothesize that similarity in demographic
characteristics will increase the probability that two cities
collaborate in a regional planning network.
Homophily and Population Size andGrowth
In addition to political and demographic characteristics
of a jurisdiction’s population, we expect variables re-
lated to population size and growth to further shape a
jurisdiction’s preferences for land-use and development
policies, and hence the transaction costs of participating
in regional planning networks. Population and growth-
related variables that shape land-use preferences may in-
clude population size, population density, urbanization
patterns, and recent growth trends. For example, a city’s
size may affect its preferences for land-use policy due to
its underlying governmental capacity. Larger cities tend
to have more extensive government operations, in both
absolute and per capita terms, and so may be better able
to service a growing population than smaller cities with
limited governmental and fiscal capacity.Citieswithhigh-
density, highly urbanized, and rapidly growing popula-
tions may prefer land-use policies that limit and manage
growth, while those with ample developable land and/or
stagnant populations may prefer land-use policies that
encourage growth and new development. We therefore
hypothesize that similarity in population size and growth
will increase the probability that two cities collaborate in a
regional planning network.
Homophily and Geographic Proximity
Finally, we expect geographic proximity to increase the
benefits and reduce the costs of regional planning. Two
6In our data, the correlation between a city’s nonwhite population
and percent registered Democrat in 2004 is r = .67. The correlation
between percent Latino and percent registeredDemocrat is r = .66.
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(or more) cities that are located physically close to one
another often share geographic features that pose com-
mon challenges or opportunities for development; deci-
sion makers can learn andmodel behavior from similarly
situated peers and engage in repeated interaction. In ad-
dition, land-use decisions in one community will often
have geographic spillovers into neighboring cities, espe-
cially those that share common borders. Jointly planning
for and regulating growth and development in closely
located cities will allow parties on both sides to better
manage and internalize these spillovers. In addition, de-
cision makers in neighboring cities may be more likely
to know one another and be more aware of common
circumstances and opportunities. Shorter distances make
it easier to meet, discuss common issues and interests,
and generally facilitate cooperation. This proximity will
lead to greater ease of forming network ties. We there-
fore hypothesize that geographic proximity will increase the
probability that two cities collaborate in a regional planning
network.
Research Design: Regional Planning
in California
To test our hypotheses, we utilize an Internet/telephone
survey of land-use, environmental, and transportation
policy stakeholders in five study regions in California
conducted from March to November 2006.7 Each of the
regions featured a regional collaborative planning pro-
cess that was designed to encourage collaboration among
local governments and other stakeholders (see Table S1).
We chose the regions by asking a small group of practic-
ing land-use and transportation professionals to identify
some of the most innovative and successful regional col-
laborations in California; the study regions are therefore
not meant to be a random sample or to reflect a quasi-
experimental design. Rather, the regions provide a prime
opportunity for a quantitative case study of political ho-
mophily in the context of strong existing collaborative
institutions designed to moderate the role of political in-
centives. A hallmark of these institutions is the effort to
build policy networks across ideological, geographic, in-
stitutional, and other boundaries (Schneider et al. 2003).
7The research occurred in two phases. The first phase (3/06–5/06)
collected data in the Merced and Tri-County regions. The second
phase (9/06–11/06) collected data for the Sacramento, San Diego,
and Riverside regions. The respondents were first contacted by
email, and then nonrespondents were contacted via telephone.
Some of the nonrespondents opted to complete the survey on the
Internet, while others completed a telephone interview.
The survey population consisted of participants in
the respective collaborative processes: all stakeholders in
the region identified as participants in Environmental
Impact Reports in the California Environmental Quality
Act database and planning staff and/or elected officials
from all city and county governments within the region.
The sample frame sought to encompass the broad range
of policy actors associated with land-use, transportation,
and environmental planning activities throughout the re-
gion, including but not limited to the specific collabora-
tive processes under study (see Table S2 for a summary
of the regional processes). There were a total of 752 re-
spondents, with response rates of 46% (127) respondents
for the Merced region, 41% (111 respondents) for the
Tri-County region, 25% (116 respondents) for the River-
side region, 42% (291 respondents) for the Sacramento
region, and 30% (107 respondents) for the San Diego re-
gion.8 All respondents were invited to participate in an
online version of the survey, which was completed by 506
respondents (67% of returned surveys). The remaining
246 respondents (33%) opted instead to complete the
survey through a telephone interview.
This article focuses exclusively on the survey re-
sponses fromcity and county respondents, includingboth
elected and appointed officials, and administrative staff.
Of the 752 individuals surveyed, 376 respondents (50%of
the sample) self-identified as representing a city or county
when asked, “What organization or category of stake-
holder do you represent in regional land-use and trans-
portation planning?” Among the representatives of local
governments, 128 individuals (17% of the sample) repre-
sent city governments as an elected or appointed official;
138 individuals (18% of the sample) represent city gov-
ernment staff; 50 individuals (7%of the sample) represent
county governments as an elected or appointed official;
and 96 individuals (13% of the sample) represent county
government staff. This survey question allowed respon-
dents to nominate multiple local governments and/or
stakeholder categories (staff versus elected/appointed of-
ficials); therefore, there is someoverlap in these categories.
For example, a small number of respondents indicatedbe-
ing both elected officials and staff. Altogether the survey
produced at least one observation for 75 of the 91 (82%)
different county and city governments in the five regions.
Our analysis of these survey data proceeds in two
parts. First, we construct collaborative networks from the
survey data for the five regions separately and combined,
8The lower response rates in Riverside and SanDiego can be at least
in part attributed to the 2003 completion of the planning effort in
Riverside and the fairly narrow focus on the North County area of
San Diego.
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create spatially explicit maps of those networks, and com-
pute and report network statistics to provide a general
understanding of the structure of those five regional net-
works. Second, we conduct an exponential random graph
model (ERGmodel, or simply ERGM) analysis to investi-
gate the political homophily hypothesis while controlling
for other network effects that may influence patterns of
regional collaboration. Results from this ERGM analysis
are consistent with an analysis of collaboration in local
government dyads using logistic regression (presented in
the supplemental information).
Mapping Local Government Planning
Networks
To identify collaboration networks, we asked each survey
respondent to “identify organizations/stakeholders that
you have collaborated with in the past three years regard-
ing regional land-use issues.”9 Respondents to the online
survey were presented with a roster of 53 possible orga-
nizations, including city- and county-elected/appointed
officials and administrative staff. Telephone interview re-
spondentswere asked to name their collaboratorswithout
the use of specific prompts. If any respondents indicated
collaborating with local government officials, they were
then prompted to write in ormention the name or names
of that local government. Note that the survey question
did not focus specifically on a particular regional plan-
ning effort, but rather focusedmore generally on land-use
planning issues. Hence, the resulting collaboration net-
works span a broad range of potential partners and policy
activities.
Constructing the collaboration network requires a
reasonable definition of network boundaries. Limiting
the network boundaries to the specific cities covered by
each regional process is insufficient because many local
government respondents named governments outside of
their regions as collaborative partners. For example, one
of our sample regions isMerced County, and thusMerced
County and any cities within it are automatically included
within the boundaries of the regional network. However,
respondents from the Merced region also named cities
outside ofMercedCounty, and local governments outside
ofMerced named cities within the county as collaborative
partners.
9It is important to recognize that this question does not distinguish
between more formal and informal types of collaboration, where
more formal modes may involve greater costs and risks to the
actors. In network jargon, this gradient could be operationalized
with valued ties; this is a good candidate for future research.
FIGURE 1 Statewide Regional Planning
Network
Hence, our network boundaries are empirically de-
fined by allowing cities or counties outside a particular
region to “opt in” to a regional network by naming a juris-
diction in the region as a collaborative partner. Cities and
counties outside the region could also be “selected in” to
the regional network if a respondent from a jurisdiction
within the region named it as a collaborative partner.
Hence, the network boundaries have a strong regional
basis as defined endogenously by the study respondents
themselves. But the network boundaries do not include
every single jurisdiction in California, because that would
artificially increase the pool of potential network partners
considered by a particular local government.
The resulting regional networks are geographically
displayed in Figure 1. The network ties are drawn be-
tween the centroids of the geographic boundaries of
each jurisdiction.10 The greater density of connections
10Each jurisdiction is represented in our dataset as a polygon that is
determinedby its geographic boundaries. The centroidof apolygon
is its center of gravity or “the point onwhich it would balance when
placed on a needle” (Weisstein 2012).
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TABLE 1 Network Statistics
REGION
Combined Network Merced Tri-County Sacramento Riverside San Diego
Network size 102 14 16 37 43 18
Density 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.20
Average degree 3.9 2.0 2.5 5.5 3.2 3.7
Maximum degree 23 10 8 23 23 13
Avg. clustering 0.66 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.62 0.77
Mean path length 3.0 2.0 2.4 2.3 2.3 1.7
Size of large component 55 13 14 37 36 15
% in large component 54% 93% 88% 100% 84% 83%
Expected path length 3.40 3.81 3.03 2.12 3.23 2.21
Expected clustering 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.21
within a region shows how the networks are regionally
focused, which is to be expected given our study de-
sign. But the networks also exhibit a substantial num-
ber of cross-regional connections, mostly to neighbor-
ing regions, but with a few long-distance connections.
For example, Sacramento region jurisdictions have three
collaborative ties with Riverside region jurisdictions. Vi-
sual inspection of the networks suggests that many of
these long-distance connections are between counties;
given the importance of counties in statewide land-use
discussions and decision-making processes, it is rea-
sonable to expect counties to have greater opportuni-
ties to make long-distance connections. However, based
on discussions with regional stakeholders, these long-
distance connections generally do not represent costly
forms of collaboration like building and sharing the
management of infrastructure. Rather, in the spirit of
epistemic communities (Haas 1992) and the diffusion
of innovations (Rogers 1962), these long-distance con-
nections are more likely to involve sharing of infor-
mation, data, and analytical tools (e.g., population and
growthmodels) focused on issues of joint interest to those
jurisdictions.
Table 1 reports descriptive network statistics for each
of the five separate regional networks and the combined
five-region network.Network size refers to the number of
local government nodes included in the network. Den-
sity refers to the proportion of possible collaborations
that are actually observed in the network, reflecting the
overall intensity and frequency of collaboration. Degree
refers to the number of collaborative partners mentioned
by each local government; thus, average degree refers to
the expected number of collaborative relationshipsmain-
tained by any given local government, whereasmaximum
degree is a measure of whether any one particular lo-
cal government maintains a disproportionate number of
collaborative ties. Clustering (also known as the cluster-
ing coefficient) is defined for a given local government
(node A) as the proportion of all possible collaborative
relationships that are observed among A’s collaborators.
Clustering reflects the degree of redundancy in network
relationships and has been proposed as one measure of
bonding social capital within policy networks (Henry,
Lubell, and McCoy 2011). Path length, or the degree of
separation between nodes, refers to the minimum num-
ber of “hops” along collaborative ties that are required to
travel from one node to the other. Average path length is
therefore one measure of the overall connectivity of the
network, where large average path lengths correspond to
more widely dispersed networks. The size of large com-
ponent refers to size of the largest set of nodes where all
local governments are connectedwith eachother via some
finite path.
The networks have a fairly low density overall, rang-
ing from .08 to .16. However, this does not mean that
the networks are disconnected and unable to function
effectively at the regional level. Instead, the networks ex-
hibit characteristics similar to “small-world networks,”
with a relatively low average path length coupled with
a high-clustering coefficient (Watts 1999). This means
that despite the existence of local subgroup structures,
there are enough links between subgroups to enable in-
formation to flow across the broader network. In our case,
these between-group linkages are provided by some of the
longer physical distance relationships where local govern-
ments are connecting beyond their immediate geographic
neighbors and between the five regional networks across
the state.
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To evaluate whether a particular network is a small-
world network, it is useful to compare the observed clus-
tering and average path length relative to what is asymp-
totically expected in a random graph (Watts 1999). The
small-world properties of our networks are demonstrated
by higher clustering coefficients and lower average path
lengths than what would be expected from a random
network (last two rows of Table 1). In a random net-
work, each dyad contains a tie with probability equal to
the network density. Thus, comparing the observed path
lengths and clustering coefficients with their expected
values yields a sense of whether the observed properties
are a result of network self-organization and endogenous
choices to collaborate or not collaborate. Although it is
beyond the scope of this article to assess how the structure
of local networks influences the effectiveness of regional
collaboration, there is an ongoing debate within the net-
work science literature as to how small-world networks
influence the evolution of cooperation (Cassar 2007; San-
tos, Rodrigues, and Pacheco 2005).
Constructing Local Government
Homophily Variables
The empirical analysis now turns to testing our hypothe-
ses about whether (and to what extent) several vari-
ables related to the similarity between local governments
predict connections between dyads within the network.
Given how our data were collected and the requirements
of the analysis software, we construct a series of distance
variables that are the inverse of similarity. Thus, our hy-
pothesized homophily effects will cause the probability
of network formation to decrease as our independent dis-
tance variables increase.
The primary independent variable is political dis-
tance. We also test and control for the effects of socioeco-
nomicandpopulation/growthdifferences andgeographic
distance. Table S2 summarizes how we constructed each
of our independent variables. To clarify, every pair or
dyad of local governments within our network boundary
represents a potential network connection. These dyads
are the units of analysis upon which construction of the
distance variables is based.
Given the complex and multidimensional nature of
political attitudes/opinions, we employ several political
distance variables in our analyses. The first is based on
October 2004 party registration data from the Califor-
nia Secretary of State, Report of Registration, reported for
each city or county in our sample. We calculate Registra-
tion Distance as the six-dimensional Euclidian distance
between jurisdictions p and q on the basis of registra-
tion for six political parties: % Republican, % Demo-
crat, % Green, % American Independent, % Libertarian,
and % Peace and Freedom. The formula for Euclidian
distance between two points p and q on n dimensions
is
√∑n
i=1 (pi − qi )2. This variable ranges from 0.51 to
65.89 in our sample. We also compute the simple dis-
tance for each dyad of the percent of voters registered as
Democrats. This measure is correlated with Registration
Distance at r = .99.
We use 2004 (as opposed to 2008) registration data in
our primary political distance measure for two reasons.11
First, it is measured prior to the survey data-collection
period of March through November 2006. Respondents
were asked about current and previous collaborations. To
the extent that cities and counties considered political dis-
tance in these decisions, we expect them to have relied on
already available/published data. Second, we expect that
the 2004 data more closely reflect the underlying steady-
state partisanship in each city or county compared with
2008. During the 2008 election cycle, the Obama cam-
paign mobilized unprecedented numbers of new voters
(Falcone and Moss 2008; Hayes 2008). Little is known
about these new registrants, particularly whether their
registration decisions convey the same sort of deep-seated
partisan identificationof their previously registered coun-
terparts (Murray 2008).12
We capture socioeconomic distance with two vari-
ables: Latino Distance and Income Distance. Latino Dis-
tance is the difference between dyad members in the per-
centage of the total population that is Latino according
to the 2000 Census (see Table S2 for the specific Census
source tables). IncomeDistance takes the absolute value of
the difference between each pair of jurisdictions on me-
dianhousehold income (in thousands of dollars) from the
2000 Census. These absolute value differences are equiv-
alent to Euclidean distance in one dimension.
We capture population size and growth patterns
with four variables:PopulationDistance, GrowthDistance,
Urbanized Distance, and Government Type. Population
Distance is the log of the absolute difference between each
pair’s population sizes;Growth Distance is the square root
11In theory, we could have used registration data from any year
close to the survey data-collection period. However, we believe the
presidential election-year figures will be more complete and accu-
rate proxies for a city’s or county’s underlying partisan composition
since many people register or reregister immediately preceding a
presidential election.
12Despite these theoretical arguments in favor of the 2004 regis-
tration data, we also construct and analyze comparable variables
using 2004 presidential election returns as well as 2008 party reg-
istration and election returns; analyses based on these alternative
operationalizations of political distance produce similar but slightly
noisier results (see supporting information).
606 ELISABETH R. GERBER, ADAM DOUGLAS HENRY, ANDMARK LUBELL
of the absolute value of the difference of percent popu-
lation change;13 Urbanized Distance is the absolute value
of the difference of percent urbanized; and Government
Type is a dummy variable for city-county dyads.
Finally, geographic distance is calculated using Arc-
GIS 9.3 as the distance in miles (divided by 10) between
the centroids of the relevant local government jurisdic-
tions. We also use GIS to construct a dummy variable
to indicate whether city-city dyads are neighbors (i.e.,
whether they share a common border).
Exponential RandomGraph Analysis
of Collaborative Ties
We use ERGM to test for the effect of political distance
on collaboration. ERGM allows researchers to model ob-
servednetwork structures as a functionof actor-level vari-
ables, dyadic variables (such as political distance), and
higher-order network effects that are hypothesized to in-
fluence the formation of collaborative ties (see Robins
et al. 2007a for a lucid introduction to ERGM). Rather
than view the formation of each collaborative linkage in
the network as an independent process occurring within
the dyad, ERGM assumes that the probability of collabo-
ration between any two local governments is conditional
on the structural properties of the network inwhich a par-
ticular dyad is embedded. In ERGM, the dependent vari-
able is the entire (observed) network, while independent
variables are the local network configurations that are hy-
pothesized to influence the choice to form or not form
collaborative ties in the local government dyads. These
parameters define a probability distribution of all possi-
ble networks for a given set of nodes, which in our case
are local governments. The observed network is viewed as
a random draw from this probability distribution. ERGM
then simulates thousands of networks andusesmaximum
likelihood to determine which parameters of the model
13In the SIENA software used for the ERGManalysis, dyadic covari-
ates may only take on integer values between 0 and 255, inclusive,
due to the waymemory is allocated internally by the program (Sni-
jders et al. 2007). Since some cities had very large rates of growth
(i.e., above 300%) and others have very little growth (i.e., close to
0%), this variable must be transformed to comport with data lim-
itations in SIENA. Taking the square root preserves more variance
in the low range of absolute differences, while still allowing us to
include the high range of growth differences in the analysis. The
square root is preferable to both linear rescaling and to taking the
log of the absolute difference, since most observations have very
small values relative to the largest differences; thus, the requirement
that dyadic covariates have integer values would make it difficult
to observe variance within the small range of values, where most of
the observations reside.
create a distribution of networks that have the same av-
erage values as the observed network. The ERGM results
reported here are convergent (have a good fit) because
the average count of network configurations in the simu-
lated family of networks is not significantly different from
those in the observed network.14
Table 2 presents the results of an ERGM analysis
of political distance on collaboration. These ERG mod-
els only estimate network relationships for cities within
the five regional boundaries. Cross-regional ties are fixed
as “structural zeros”; that is, they are not considered a
stochastic variable in the ERGM estimation.15 The direc-
tion and significance of the ERGM coefficients are inter-
preted analogously to a logit model, with the signs of the
coefficients on thedistance variables indicating increasing
or decreasing probabilities of collaborative relationships
within local government dyads.16 For comparison, we
report analogous logit estimates in the supporting infor-
mation section.
Each column in Table 2 represents a separate ERGM
that includes various combinations of our distance vari-
ables. The first column reports the effect of political dis-
tance effects only; the second column reports the effects of
political distance plus demographic and socioeconomic
distance; and the third column reports results from the
full model, including political distance, demographic and
socioeconomic distance, population distance, and geo-
graphic distance effects. All threemodels include network
effects, which are discussed in more detail below.
14Model convergence is assessed by comparing the average value of
simulated network statistics against the “target” values within the
observed network—this deviation of simulated values from their
targets yields a t-statistic,which isused to assessmodel convergence.
Snijders et al. (2007) suggest that t-statistics should be less than
0.15 in absolute value before one can safely say that convergence
has been obtained for ERG models. All ERG models reported in
this article are convergent with t-statistics no more than 0.10 in
absolute value—this is a more conservative threshold for assessing
model convergence.
15However, a given city can belong to more than one region (i.e.,
it can opt in or be selected in), and so those cross-region ties are
included in the analysis.
16ERGM coefficients are interpreted as the log-odds of a collabo-
rative linkage being formed (versus not formed) if the formation
of that link would create the associated network configuration. For
continuous variables such as political distance, coefficient estimates
reflect the increased or decreased probability of collaboration for
every unit increase in the independent variable. Specifically, if a
given political distance variable has parameter estimate b, and the
odds of collaboration when political distance is zero is a, then in-
creasing political distance by d units will multiply the odds-ratio of
collaboration by ebd (yielding an odds-ratio of collaboration equal
to a · ebd).
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TABLE 2 Dyadic Collaboration between Local
Government in Five California
Regions. Exponential RandomGraph
Model (ERGM), DV= Collaboration
between Pairs of Local Governments
ERG ERG ERG
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Political Distance
Party Registration −.026∗∗∗ −.019∗∗ −.016∗
(.008) (.009) (.009)
Socioeconomic Distance
Percent Latino −.018∗∗∗ −.020∗∗
(.006) (.008)
Median HH Income −.018∗∗ −.021∗∗
(.007) (.009)
Population Size and Growth Distance
Total Population −.030
(.046)
Growth 1990–2000 −.002
(.010)
Percent Urban −.011∗∗∗
(.004)
City-County .869∗∗∗
(.220)
Geographic Distance
Distance (10 miles) −.149∗∗∗
(.033)
Neighbors 1.624∗∗∗
(.276)
Network Effects
Alternating k-stars −.563∗∗∗ −.590∗∗∗ −.390∗∗
(.149) (.144) (.177)
Alternating 1.253∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗∗ .982∗∗∗
k-triangles (.148) (.151) (.164)
Independent .042∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗ .058∗∗∗
k-two-paths (.004) (.005) (.013)
Note: Cell entries report ERGM coefficients, standard errors (in
parentheses), and p-values.
∗∗∗p< 0.01, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗p< 0.10 (two-tailed tests).
Homophily Effects on Collaboration
Several notable results emerge from Table 2. First, our
political distance variable is negative and significant in all
models. In other words, higher levels of political distance
significantly lower the probability that two jurisdictions
will collaborate in a regional planning network, even after
controlling for demographic, population, and geographic
factors (ERG Model 3). Put differently, jurisdictions that
are very different politically are less likely to collaborate,
and those that are similar politically are more likely to
collaborate. These results are consistent with our main
hypothesis and imply a high level of political homophily
in these regional planning networks.
Second, several of the other distance variables are
statistically significant as well. Dyads with greater de-
mographic and socioeconomic differences are less likely
to collaborate (i.e., those with more similarities are more
likely to collaborate). Local governments with greater dif-
ferences in the percent urbanized variable are less likely
to collaborate, while those with different government
types (i.e., city-county dyads) are more likely to form
ties. The city-county effect is an interesting exception to
homophily because cities are nested within counties and
many land-use decisions (e.g., annexation) require joint
decision making between cities and counties. Counter to
our hypotheses, population and growth differences do
not have a significant effect on collaboration.
Third, geographic distance is a very important driver
of collaborative ties. The variables measuring distance in
miles and whether both cities in a dyad are neighbors are
both highly significant, suggesting that geographic prox-
imity increases levels of interdependence and opportuni-
ties for repeated interactions and reduces the transaction
costs of collaboration.
Higher-Order Network Effects on
Collaboration
In addition to our distance variables, the model con-
tains three network structural effects: alternating k-stars,
alternating k-triangles, and alternating independent k-
two-paths. These network statistics take into account the
tendency for a network to exhibit transitive closure (alter-
nating k-triangles), to cluster around central high-degree
and popular hubs (alternating k-stars), and to exhibit a
type of edge clustering that is a precondition for tran-
sitive relationships to emerge in the network (indepen-
dent k-two-paths). All of the network structural char-
acteristics are significant. While the network structural
characteristics are included to appropriately account for
interdependence, they also have some interesting sub-
stantive interpretations (Robins et al. 2007b). The nega-
tive k-star parameter suggests that popularity processes
are moderated, ties are more evenly distributed across
the network, and any clumping in the network is due
to overlapping patterns of transitivity forming multiple
cores. While some local governments are popular within
a particular subgroup, there is not a tendency for actors
to be popular across the entire network, which in our
case encompasses much of the state of California. The
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structure of our research design provides one explana-
tion for this finding—our definition of “regional” net-
works is centered on five different regions and naturally
creates multiple cores. However, we explicitly control for
geographic proximity; thus, the networks exhibit a self-
organizing principle around transitivity that goes beyond
geographic clustering. Berardo and Scholz (2010) have
forwarded the hypotheses that transitivity processes such
as those captured by k-triangles suggest the presence of
risky cooperation games, which is also the underlying
assumption of the ICA perspective. Networks withmulti-
ple cores are also consistent with the concept of polycen-
tric governance, where political authority is distributed
throughout different groups of actors in a region. In ad-
dition, transitivity in a network is facilitated by policy
brokers attempting to build political coalitions among
multiple actors.
Conclusion
This articlemakes a number of contributions to the litera-
tures on local government decision making, institutional
collective action, and political networks. The first is that
we find evidence for a political logic of collective action
that increases the likelihood of collaboration between po-
litically similar cities. Political homophily reduces the po-
litical transaction costs of regional collaboration, and the
network models suggest that political similarity increases
the probability of forming network ties.
Second, we investigate, expand, and provide empir-
ical evidence for some of the core hypotheses of the in-
stitutional collective action approach to understanding
the benefits and transaction costs of local government
collaboration. Local governments with similar political
and sociodemographic characteristics in terms of parti-
sanship, race/ethnicity, and income aremore likely to col-
laborate because they have similar policy preferences and
thus face fewer transaction costs associated with bargain-
ing over collective goods. Politically similar local govern-
ments also have higher benefits of collaboration because
they can learn from each other’s policy experiments.
In addition to these “choice-based” drivers of co-
operation, geographic proximity is also associated with
collaboration (Kossinets and Watts 2009; McPherson,
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Geographically proximate
jurisdictions have higher levels of interdependence and
thus experience more opportunities for joint gains or
avoiding joint costs. Geographic proximity may also “in-
duce” homophily: physically proximate cities engage in
repeated interactions that make collaborationmore likely
and reduce the logistical costs of interaction. As with var-
ious types of nonpolitical networks (e.g., scientific col-
laboration), our political network models confirm the
importance of geographic proximity.
Finally, we consider the implications of our find-
ings for expandingcollaborationwithin regionalplanning
networks.The roleofpolitical homophilyhighlights a ten-
sion between democratic norms of accountability versus
representation. On the one hand, the fact that local gov-
ernments with similar preferences and circumstances are
more likely to collaborate is consistent with local govern-
ments being accountable to citizen preferences and find-
ing ways to effectively pursue common policy interests.
On the other hand, this same tendency for homophily
greatly reduces the potential for redistribution across a
region. Numerous observers have remarked on the in-
creasing sorting of people into homogenous communities
and resulting inequalities across our nation’s metropoli-
tan areas (Bishop 2008; Katz 2000; Orfield 1997). Re-
gional planning and other forms of regionalism represent
key opportunities for addressing these stark inequalities
by redistributing the costs and benefits of development
across the region. To the extent that cities seek out and
form network ties with others that are like them, there is
little to redistribute and few tools to facilitate redistribu-
tion.
However, the regional planning networks we study
also exhibit a strong tendency toward transitivity, which
may help ameliorate the tension between local account-
ability and regional redistribution. Policy brokers at the
apex of transitive network structures can potentially en-
courage collaboration among heterogeneous actors de-
spite the strong influence of political, demographic, and
geographic homophily in driving collaboration among
local governments. But these policy brokers may also be
subject to some of the same political incentives driving
homophily in the first place. Thus, the professional and
personal norms of any policy brokers will be crucial for
the capacity of regional planning to engage in redistri-
bution. For example, if policy brokers are selected from
professional planning schools and are trained to resist
ideological politics and place more emphasis on techni-
cal rationality, they may reduce the more negative effects
of homophily. But if policy brokers are selected through
a more political process, or professional norms dictate
strong adherence to local citizen preferences, then the
tendency for homophily will be enhanced. This article
suggests that such political incentives play an important
role in the context of regional land-use planning, and
how political and technical rationality interact deserves
more study in local government policy, and inmany other
policy arenas.
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